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I. THE PLACE OF INTENT IN THE RESTATEMENTS

The concept of intent has always been at the root of some of
tort law's most basic categories. The primitive action for trespass,
for example, assumed that, at the very least, the trespasser intended to perform the act that resulted in the touching about which
the plaintiff complains; a man thrown into another's close is not a
trespasser. After the development of the modern categories of tort
law, trespass helped form the foundation of the category of intentional torts. Sometimes, though, the very fact that a great deal of
effort is required to do something is evidence of controversy or at
least confusion. One might draw this conclusion from looking at the
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treatment of intent-and its close cousin, "recklessness"-in the Restatements.
It is interesting to note, for example, that the Restatement
(First)did not define "intent." The Restatement (First) referred to
intent in the course of defining battery.' In Section 13, at Comment
(d), the Reporter noted that, in addition to purposeful contact, battery may include contacts performed with "the knowledge on the
part of the actor that such contact ... is substantially certain to be

produced."2 This commentary is the only clue that the concept of
intent assumed by the Restatement may not be identical to that contained in laypersons' use of the term. On the other hand, the Restatement (First) did define "recklessness." To what can we attribute this differential treatment? It seems that, in contrast to recklessness, the American Law Institute ("ALI") seemed to think that
the concept of "intent" was so well-understood, so deeply a part of
the language, that it was no more necessary to define the word "intent" than it would have been to define the word "person."
Unlike the Restatement (First),the Restatement (Second) did
define "intent" in a section devoted to just that purpose: Section 8A.
As the Reporter noted, 8A represented an expansion of the Restatement (First)'sSection 13, Comment d. Apparently, by 1965 the
ALI had recognized the need to clarify the definition of intent, and
they did so by offering a generic definition-one which intended to
govern the entire Restatement. Unlike comment d, 8A was to serve
modularly: its abstract definition was designed to work as well in
battery as in defamation. Nonetheless, like Comment d, 8A had
been designed as a response to a need that had arisen in the context
of a battery case, Garrett v. Dailey.3 In order to explain why the
eight year old boy in Garrett could have been found liable for battery, the Washington Supreme Court explained that intent means
not only having a desire to do harm, but also knowing with "substantial certainty" that one will do harm, even if one does not desire
to do harm. Without doubt, the "substantial certainty" prong is one
solution to the problem posed by Garrett.4 The purpose of this Essay
is to point out that the solution adopted in the Restatement (Second)

1. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13 (1934) ('(a) the act is done with the intention of
bringing about a harmful content. .
Id. § 13, cmt. d.
2.
3.
Garret v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
4.
As the Reporters for Restatement (Third)note, the facts of Garrett do not really support
the theoretical structure that 8A is supposed to illustrate. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 1 (Discussion Draft Apr. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
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is not optimal, and that it should not be carried forward into the
Restatement (Third).
The Restatement (Third) not only defines "intent," it promotes what was once a mere comment to the most prominent position: it is now Section 1. Its cousin, "recklessness" has also received
a promotion. It has been moved from Section 500 to Section 2. The
Reporters of the Restatement (Third) seem to be saying that not
only is the definition of intent (and its distinction from recklessness) part of the Restatement's mission, but also that the two definitions are fundamental. Furthermore, the definition of intent has
grown. In the Restatement (Second) the two-pronged definition required only a single, structurally simple sentence:
§ 8A. Iiitent
The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote
that the actor desires to cause the consequence of his act, or that he believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.

In the current draft of Restatement (Third), the same two-pronged
definition is broken up into two clearly defined sections:
§ 1. Intentional
An actor's causation of harm is intentional if the actor brings about that harm either purposefully or knowingly.
(a) Purpose. An actor purposefully causes harm by acting with the desire to bring
about that harm.
(b) Knowledge. An actor knowingly causes harm by engaging in conduct believing
that harm is substantially certain to result.

The definition of reckless is similarly divided into two distinct
prongs, although not to provide two independently sufficient conditions, but to provide two jointly necessary conditions:
§ 2. Reckless
An actor's conduct is reckless if.
(a) the actor knows of the risk of harm created by the actor's conduct, or knows
facts that make that risk obvious to anyone in the actor's situation, and
(b)the precaution that would eliminate or reduce that risk involves burdens that
are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the actor's failure to
adopt the precaution a demonstration of the actor's indifference to the risk.

The increasing centrality and complexity of the definitions of
intent and recklessness over the past century have paralleled the
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increasing complexity of the issues necessitating their application.
Whether an act is characterized as intentional, reckless, or negligent may determine whether punitive damages are available,
whether contribution is permitted in comparative fault, whether a
tort judgment will be dischargeable in bankruptcy, whether liability
insurance will cover an insured's tortious conduct, whether a
worker will be able to exit the workman's compensation system and
sue her employer in tort, whether emotional distress will be available to a bystander, whether a municipality can be sued in tort,
whether affirmative defenses are available, and whether the statute of limitations applicable to a given action. In each of these areas, one can imagine that predictable struggles emerge between
plaintiffs and defense-oriented advocates over the effects on liability of labeling an action "intentional," "reckless," or "negligent."
II. HENDERSON AND TWERSKI'S CRITIQUE
In their contribution to this symposium, Professors
Henderson and Twerski offer a generally positive assessment of Restatement (Third)'s approach to the problem of defining intent and
recklessness. They approve of the idea that these concepts can be
defined "generically" for the entire universe of torts contained in
the Restatement. Within the construction of the definitions themselves, they approve of the Reporters decision to retain Restatement
(Second)'s focus on "consequences." The definition should, they
claim, turn on the actor's mental state with regard to the results of
her act, not on the mental state that produced the act itself, which
they note, correctly, captures merely the concept of volition.5
On the other hand, Henderson and Twerski disapprove of the
way in which the Restatement (Third) builds the concept of "harm"
into the definition of intent. 6 As they point out, the Restatement
(Second) merely requires that an actor intend a consequence. A few
intentional torts, such as intentional interference with economic
advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress, require
that the actor intend a consequence that is in itself harmful (and

5.

See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The

PracticalCraft of Restating the Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1137 (2001) ("[Tihe concepts of
intent and recklessness [should] focus on the consequences of acts, rather than on the acts them.
selves.").
6.
See id. at 1135, 1153.
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known to be so), while many others, such as battery, do not.7 It may
be that the difference is without consequence. Under the Restatement (Second) approach, the task of narrowing the range of intended consequences for which an actor may be held liable in a tort
such as intentional interference with economic advantage is handled by additional elements within the tort. According to the Restatement (Second) Section 766, Comment j, any act that, according
to 8A's definition of intent, was intended to produce an interference
with another's contract satisfies the "intent" element of the prima
facie case under Section 766. Whether an intended interference is
within the scope of the tort's protection depends on further conditions within the prima facie case, such as whether the interference
was improper. 8 The Restatement (Third) approach would seemingly
expect one to look ahead to the definition of "harm" within a given
tort: the definition of intent in Section 1 presumes that one already
knows whether the Restatement rules for that tort require intent to
bring about a harmful consequence. I suspect that this difference
will turn out to be nothing more than a terminological dispute.
There is one area of disagreement between the Discussion
Draft's definition of intent and Henderson and Twerski's that is not
merely terminological, in which they have identified a real problem
with Restatement (Third)'s definition of intent. As I will argue below, however, the solution they offer is insufficient to meet their
own concerns since, in my opinion, the problem with which they are
concerned is rooted in Restatement (Second)'s Section 8A.
Henderson and Twerski raise the problem to which I refer on
pages 1138-1143 of their article. As they note, Section 1 retains and
expands Section 8A's two-prong definition of intent. The
first prong, based on an actor's desires, has never raised

7.
A battery may occur if the actor merely intends a contact that turns out, because of unknowable and unpredictable circumstances, to be harmful. In such a case, the intended contact

is tortious not because of any harmful quality of the contact intended, but because of other circumstances which, having been set out by the tort of battery, were satisfied by the defendant
independent of the content of his intent. See W. PAGE KEErON ET. AL. PROSSER AND KEETON ON

THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (5th ed. 1984) (Battery) [hereinafter PROSSER). This is not true in most
economic torts, for example. In intentional interference with economic advantage, the actor
interfering with a contract must intend to interfere with a contract: at the very least, he must
know that there is a contract and that his act, whether in his own mind justified, innocent, or

spiteful, will produce the specific result of a contract interference. See id. § 129 (Interference
with Contractual Relations), especially the text accompanying notes 42-50. This is also true of
injurious falsehood, as interpreted by the Restatement (Second). See RFESTATE.MENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 623A (1965).
8.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767.
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much controversy. 9 The second prong, based on the actor's
knowledge or beliefs about the results of her actions, has always
been the source of confusion, and not only to first year torts students trying to decipher Garrett v. Dailey. The second prong relies
on what I will refer to as the "belief theory" of intent: that one intends consequence C if one, when choosing to act, is substantially
certain that one's action will cause C, even if one does not want C to
occur. The question of whether to attribute intent to an actor under
such circumstances has been discussed in theological circles under
the rubric of "double effect."' 0
Henderson and Twerski's concern with the belief theory is
not rooted in wholesale skepticism. Regardless of what they may
think of it from a theological or philosophical perspective, they
think that it played a useful role in Restatement (Second) and was
properly retained in Restatement (Third). Their concern is at the
retail level: they want to make sure that the second prong of section
1 is not misunderstood or abused by the courts. Section 1 (b) refers
to an actor "engaging in conduct believing that harm is substantially certain to occur." Henderson and Twerski are concerned that
this would allow a court to find intent in cases where the actor either (1) engages in a repetitious activity that, over time, produces
an almost certain risk of injury, or (2) commits a single act, that,
over repeat encounters with various possible victims, produces an
almost certain risk of injury. An example of Henderson and Twerski's first concern is a baseball player who knows, over the course of
an entire season, that he will hit at least one ball into the stands
which will hit a spectator. We can call this a case of an "iterated
low risk act." An example of Henderson and Twerski's second concern is a factory owner who removes a guard from a machine,
knowing that (assuming 100 workers encounter the machine) one of
the workers will be injured. We can call this a case of an "iterated
low risk victim." Henderson and Twerski believe that the American
Law Institute does not want to imply that either the baseball player
"intended" to hit the spectator, or that the factory owner "intended"
to injure the worker.

Although some people may find disquieting the degree to which both Sections 8A and 1
9.
allow 'moral luck' to play a role in attributing intent to irrational desires, comment d's Illustration 2 allows an actor to be held as "intending" a result which she simultaneously desires and
believes is unlikely to occur. See Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 1.
10. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrineof the Double Effect, in
VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19-32 (1978).
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As currently written, Section 1 might certainly run afoul of
the concerns raised by Henderson and Twerski. Comment f of the
Discussion Draft vaguely acknowledges the problem, it but does not
suggest a solution other than calling on courts to "appreciate the
limits" of substantial certainty in the second prong. Henderson and
Twerski call for a change in the language, and (I think) a clearer
statement by the Reporters in the comments. First, they call on the
Institute to replace the expression "engaging in conduct" with the
word "act" in 1(b). Second, they insist that the Restatement be understood to mean that "for a consequence to be intended in the 'belief with certainty' sense, not only must the act producing the consequence be discrete, but the consequence complained of must result directly and proximately (both temporarily and spatially) from
the act."' I assume that this "understanding" would be contained in
Comment f.
While I sympathize with Henderson and Twerski's concerns,
I think that their proposed solution is inadequate to solve the
problem they have identified. For example, while changing the terminology might prevent a court from finding intent in the case of
the iterated low risk act, I am skeptical that the change in language
suggested by Henderson and Twerski, even conjoined with an expanded Comment f, will provide a principled guide for judges or
lawyers. This is easiest to see in the case involving an iterated lowrisk victim. The Discussion Draft's Illustration 3 describes an actor
whose smelter sends particulate into the air. Depending on the direction of the wind, the particulate will land on some, but not all of
the landowners' property surrounding the actor. 12 The actor does
not desire the particulate to land on anyone's property, and he certainly does not intend that it fall on the property of any specific
landowner, but he is substantially certain it will land on someone's
property. The Restatement (Third) says that this satisfies section
1(b), and it would still satisfy it even if Henderson and Twerski's
terminological change were adopted. In what way is Illustration 3
distinguishable from a case in which an actor refuses to repair a
piece of machinery, which, used by various employees over the
course of a month, inevitably injured one of them? 3 Or a case in

11.

Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1143.

12. The example is based on Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co.. 709 P.2d 782
(Wash. 1985).
13. This example is based on the facts of Noonan v. Spring Creek Forest Products,Inc, 700
P.2d 623 (Mont. 1985), in which an employee lost four fingers on a planing machine that his
employer refused to repair. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the employee could not sue

in tort for battery but instead was entitled to workman's compensation because the employer
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which an actor ordered his employees, as a group, to perform a cerone of
tain unsafe act that carried with it a measurable risk, until
14
the employees was injured by the realization of that risk?
In both Illustration 3 and the two examples I offer, the actor
is not engaged in a "course of conduct": the single spew of particulate, the single refusal to repair, and the single command, all pose a
100% chance that someone will suffer harm. Furthermore, in Illustration 3, no more and no less than the latter examples, we assume
that the actor did not desire the harm to occur but, knowing all the
facts, was "substantially certain" it would occur. It is difficult to see
how any instruction concerning directness or proximate cause could
help distinguish between Illustration 3 and the latter examples.
The injuries, resulting from the defective machine or the risky instructions, were caused directly. Moreover, the injuries could just
as easily have occurred within 24 hours of the creation of the risk
as within a month; the time the injuries occurred is a function of
the operation of the probabilities and not evidence of the remoteness of the injury., 5
III. THE PROBLEM WITH BELIEF
I share Henderson and Twerski's (and the Restatement
(Third) Reporters') anxiety that cases involving iterated low risk
acts and iterated low risk victims should not be considered "intentional" under Section 1. As I have argued above, none of the
changes suggested by Henderson and Twerski resolve this anxiety.

was not substantially certain that his act (the failure to repair the planer) would harm the em.
ployee. Id. at 625-26.
14. This example is based on the facts of Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 639 A.2d 507

(Conn. 1994), in which an employee lost two fingers in the feeding chute of a plastics injection
mold because the employer ordered all the employees to clean the chute without turning the
machine off (to save time). The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a jury could find that
the employer was substantially certain that his act (ordering the machine to be cleaned while in
operation) would harm the employee, in which case the employee would be allowed to leave the

workman's compensation system and sue the employer for battery. Id. at 515-16. On remand, a
jury found that the employer had in fact not been substantially certain. See Suarez v. Dickmont
Plastics Corp., 698 A.2d 838 (Conn. 1997)).
15. This may explain why, as is noted in Comment b to Section 1, many courts have simply
refused to adopt the belief prong in workman compensation cases. See Discussion Draft, supra
note 4, at § 1 (listing cases that require "something like purposeful harm on the part of the employer" in determining whether an employer has acted with intent). While I agree with the intuition behind these courts' resistance to adopting the belief prong in these cases, I find the ad
hoc solution adopted by these courts disturbing. If "intent" is to be a generic and modular termwarranting its primary position as the first defined term in the Restatement-then either it does
or does not include the belief prong. The term cannot switch between a narrow and broad definition of'inten without any principled rationale. See infra text accompanying nn. 29.32.
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The reason why they will not be able to solve the problem they raise
with a "quick" terminological fix is because the problem is not with
the words selected to express Section 1(b). The problem is Section
1(b) itself. The belief prong is not compatible with our governing
intuitions about the meaning of the word intent, and any attempt to
accommodate them will lead to frustration.
I am well aware that the philosophical literature concerning
the concept of intent is vast, and this brief Essay is not the place to
begin to canvas the various positions that have developed over the
years. I will just point out that the position adopted in Restatement
(Second)'s Section 8A is not without its critics in the realm of philosophy and law.16 As John Finnis argues, it is strange, as a matter
of ordinary language philosophy, to treat belief as if it were the
same as desire. For example, imagine that my only hope on the
eighteenth hole at the end of a round of golf in which I am badly
losing is to hit the ball as hard as I can to a green surrounded by
water, hoping for a freak accident to produce a hole-in-one (as opposed to hitting the ball less hard and hoping to reach the hole
while avoiding the water, in three or four strokes). It would be absurd to say that, having chosen to try for the hole-in-one, that my
intent is to hit the water. Yet, that is just what the belief prong of
Section 1 requires us to say, since, although my desire is to hit the
cup, I am substantially certain that I will hit the water. 17
Finnis' observation is simply a clever way of expressing what
anyone who has taught Garrett v. Dailey has experienced firsthand: that any serious application of the belief prong requires us to
engage in strange verbal contortions. The strangest of all, of course,
is the concept of "substantial certainty" itself, which, like Voltaire's
God, seems to have been invented out of necessity, since it resembles no intuitively familiar mental state and is famously difficult to
explain to skeptical first year students who have not yet checked
their common sense at the law school's front door. It is something
less than certainty (which would be too strong) and more than
highly probable (which would be too weak, and would collapse the
whole category into recklessness). It is a concept, which, having no
fixed meaning, can, as the workman's compensation cases discussed
above show, mean whatever a judge wants.

16. See, e.g., G. E. M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 41-45 (1957) (citing §§ 644 and 659 of LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ); John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OFTORT LAV 229-48 (David G. Owen ed., 1995)
17 Finnis, supra note 16, at 243.
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If Finnis is right, then there is something fishy about the
belief prong in tort law. 18 As Henderson and Twerski state in their
article, there is no reason to adopt the vocabulary of nonlegal disciplines in law; just because philosophers like Anscombe and Wittgenstein would find the two-pronged definition of intent problematic, this does not mean that it cannot serve, however imperfectly,
the practical needs of litigation. 19 The caution, however, goes in the
other direction as well. The two prongs of section 1 seem to be modeled after sections 2.02(a) and 2.02(b) of the Model Penal Code,
which distinguish between acting with a purpose to bring about a
harm and acting with knowledge that a harm will result. 20 This dis-

tinction may serve useful ends in the course of crafting rules for the
criminal law, but it is not clear that it helps in tort law, which, after all, has somewhat different goals and mechanisms.
It therefore may be of value to ask a heretical question: do
we even need the belief prong in the definition of intent in the Restatement of Torts? What would happen if it were removed and intent was defined by the desire prong alone? My contention is:
nothing. The goals of tort law would still be achieved, more or less,
but we will have gained some not-insignificant conceptual order.
The primary function of the belief prong in tort law is to provide a way for certain wrongs to be brought under the rubric of "intentional tort." As a practical matter, almost all of the wrongs,
which are captured by the belief prong that would escape capture
by the desire prong, would probably also be the sort of acts for
which one could sue in negligence. 2' I alluded at the beginning of

18. Sometimes the disconnect between our ordinary language and "intent" in tort is revealed by encounters with other parts of our own law. For example, it is standard practico in
insurance contracts to state that the insurer will not indemnify the insured for damage that is

"expected or intended" by the insured. See Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal.
App. 4th 715, 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). As the court in Shell explained, the expression "expected," which is standard in the insurance industry, would have no meaning if tho word "intended" was interpreted to include a belief prong. Restatement (Second)'s definition of intent,
from the perspective of insurance law, is "specialized" and inconsistent with how laypersons usa
English. Id.; see also infra text accompanying nn. 37-40. See also Peter Cane, Mens Rea in Tort

Law, 20 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 533, 535 (2000) (belief prong "blurs" the distinction between intention and recklessness).
19. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1136.
20. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 470 (1992) (discussing Model Penal Code's distinction between acting with a purpose and acting with knowledge).
21. The one set of cases which Henderson and Twerski discuss which I will not are the cases
they classify as "mental breakdown" cases: "an actor may believe that a consequence is certain to
follow from an act, but nevertheless not subjectively desire that result." Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 5, at 1140. I leave for another time why, as a matter of policy, we would want to hold
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this Essay to the many important distinctions that lay on either
side of the intent/negligence divide (punitive damages, insurance
coverage, workman's compensation, etc.). Assuming that this divide
is important for our current system, it is worth asking whether too
many cases that would currently be considered intentional torts
would be reclassified as negligence if the belief prong were eliminated.
Fewer cases would be moved across the border than one
might suspect. This is because, unlike criminal law, tort law does
not recognize subtle distinctions between different levels of wrongful desires. Under criminal law, the difference in years spent in jail
may vary depending on whether an actor desired to kill someone
and did so or whether an actor desired to kill a dog, but accidentally
killed its master. This is not so in tort. According to the doctrine of
transferred intent, an intentional tort involving trespass to chattel
or assault that results in battery is treated as a battery.2 This
means that many of the "double effect" cases that inspired Restatement (Second)'s adoption of the belief prong are actually pretty
simple desire cases. Take for example, a version of the "regretful
bomber" illustration: imagine that actor D bombs V's house because
D desires to destroy the house. Assume further that D knows that V
is in the house. D is "kind of' certain that V will die if the house is
bombed, but does not desire V to die. As a matter of criminal law, it
might make a great deal of difference if we could charge that D
killed V "knowingly" since, as Ken Simons points out, the Model
Penal Code sometimes draws many practical distinctions between
desire and belief.23 This distinction, however, is irrelevant in tort
law. There is no need to delve into the metaphysics of whether
"kind of' certain is "substantially" certain. If D desired to destroy
another's property without privilege, that is trespass to chattel. If
his trespass also is the proximate cause of a battery, then, according to the doctrine of transferred intent, D is also liable for battery.
Transferred intent may strike criminal law theorists as indefensibly crude (lacking the subtlety of felony murder) but their incom-

mentally defective actors liable in tort at all; I take it is as obvious that there is little reason to
insist on holding them liable in intentional tort.
22. See PROSSER, supra note 7, § 8 (Meaning of Intent), especially text accompanying nn.
32-44 C 'Transferred' Intent"). Of course, there may be a predictable difference in the manner in

which juries award punitive damages between "purposeful" battery cases and cases of transferred intent.

23. Simons, supranote 20, at 470. The Model Penal Code equates purpose and knowledge
in its definition of homicide; it exploits the distinguishablility of Sections 2.02(2)(a) and 2.02(2)(b)
in criminal conspiracy, solicitation, attempts, and burglary. See id. at n.23.
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prehension only reinforces my conviction that even if certain areas
of the law-such as criminal law-need to worry about whether the
belief prong (and its standard, "substantial certainty") can ever be
rendered coherent, tort law does not.
Once the doctrine of transferred intent is brought back into
the equation, the compelling need for the belief prong begins to
shrink. It must be conceded, though, that it will not shrink to zero.
A handful of cases remain that will not be captured by the desire
prong plus transferred intent, which the courts have traditionally
treated as intentional torts, because they are pure "double effect"
cases that can only be called intentional torts if the belief prong is
retained. For example, assume that D wants to burn his own house
down. Further assume that D knows that V is inside D's house, that
D is "kind of' certain that V will die if the house is burned, but that
D does not desire V to die. If D burns his house and V dies, it would
be difficult to hold D liable in intentional tort unless we retained
the belief prong.
The case just described-which I would call a case of
"Nontrespassatory Double Effect"-will be very rare. Nonetheless,
does their very existence warrant the retention of the belief prong
in Section 1? I think not. There is certainly something awful about
cases of Nontrespassatory Double Effect, and D, in such a case,
should be viewed as more wrongful than if he had killed V by negligently burning his own property. 24 But that does not mean that the
wrong, which motivates our censure of D, is that D intended to kill
V. I would hold, with Finnis and Anscombe, that this characterization of D's conduct inaccurately describes D's conduct.
If one reflects on the example of Nontrespassatory Double
Effect described above, one sees that it is similar in some respects
to a case involving certain iterated low risk victims. It is not too
different, for example, from a case involving a conscious design
choice by a manufacturer of 1000 units of a product, which is known
by the manufacturer to violate reasonable care (e.g. risk/utility) and
is guaranteed to injure or kill 0.001% of its users. 25 Such products

24. See Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837) (actor with less-than average intolligence negligently burned neighbor's property; some evidence that he knowingly accepted the

risk).
25. This is a highly stylized version of the sort of claim alleged in many products liability
suits. See, for example, the (erroneous) characterization of Ford's conduct in manufacturing the
Pinto in Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice:PunitiveDamages and Legal Pluralism,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1394, 1436 (1993) (discussing Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(Cal. 1981)). For a better understanding of Ford's conduct, see generally Gary Schwartz, The
Myth of the FordPinto Case, 43 RUTGERs L. REV. 1013 (1991).
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liability cases, if proven, result in the award of punitive damages
because the manufacturer acted recklessly or demonstrated conscious indifference to the rights of the victims. They are not brought
as intentional torts. 26 In a products case where the defendant is
found to be reckless or consciously indifferent, the wrong, which
warrants exemplary damages, is not that the defendant intended to
harm the victim, but that he knowingly imposed a risk on the victim, which could have been eliminated with minimum effort. The
wrong at the heart of an act of Nontrespassatory Double Effect is
the same: whatever D's reasons for burning his house down, they
cannot justify the knowing imposition of the (large) risk of injury on
V. The fact that D does not desire to harm V matters to the same
extent that it matters that a manufacturer does not desire to harm
the one consumer out of a thousand whom it knows will be harmed
by its product. Neither D nor the manufacturer are guilty of intending harm, but they are guilty of acting recklessly: that is, with
conscious and willful indifference to the risk imposed on the un-

lucky victim.
It might seem strange to equate a case of Nontrespassatory
Double Effect and products liability. But there really is no difference between the two from the perspective of the definition of recklessness contained in the Restatement (Second) section 500, which
has been adopted, relatively unchanged, in the Restatement (Third)
Section 2. One might object that in the Nontrespassatory Double
Effect example above, D cannot be acting "recklessly" because in
choosing to burn his own house down with V inside, D is not imposing a "risk" (willfully, grossly, or otherwise) on V; rather, D is
imposing a harm on V. This seems to be an odd reading of the Discussion Draft's definition of recklessness, which does not distinguish between large (close to 100%) and small (close to 0%) risks.
According to Section 2, D is reckless when he knowingly imposes an
unreasonable risk on his victim, and when the magnitude of that
risk is disproportionateto the cost of acting reasonably.2 Just as

26. There have been attempts to bring criminal charges on the basis of conscious indifference in product design and manufacture. After the a handful of civil cases were tried against

Ford because of alleged defects in the Pinto, a district attorney's office charged Ford with reckless homicide. Ford was acquitted. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at n.11 (describing Indiana v.
Ford Motor Co., Cause No. 11-431 (1980)).
27. It might be objected that in this discussion I have downplayed the fact that Section 2
does not require subjective knowledge of either the fact that D is imposing a risk on V, or that
the risk is disproportionate to the burden of reducing the risk. Section 2 only requires that D
knows facts that "make the risk obvious to anyone" in D's situation. This would certainly be the

case had the language from the Restatement (Second) Section 500 been retained (knowing or
having reason to know of facts"). But, as Comment c to Section 2 of the Restatement (Third)
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one can act recklessly by imposing a slight risk that has been "gratuitously" created, 28 one can act recklessly by imposing a great
risk-one so large that the actor is "substantially certain" it will be
realized and that the magnitude of the risk is disproportionate to
the cost of removing the risk.
There is no reason why all of the remaining belief prong
cases that would not otherwise be captured by the desire prong plus
transferred intent would not easily fit under Section 2's definition
of recklessness. In a typical Nontrespassatory Dotible Effect case,
like the one described above, the person accused of intending to
harm the victim really has displayed an outrageous degree of indifference toward his victim. Rather than harm his victim out of an
excess of wrongful desire to harm, he has harmed his victim out of
an obscene lack of concern. The actor wants the thing he wants so
much that he does not care whether another person gets harmed in
the course of obtaining the desired object. In this way, the man who
burns down his house knowing that V is inside, the employer who
refuses to spend money to repair a machine knowing that an employee will be hurt, or a manufacturer who refuses to change a design in order to save money knowing that a consumer will be injured are all acting recklessly according to the Restatement (Third)
Section 2. This fits with our conventional intuitions as well. While
it seems strange to say in these cases that the wrong with which
the tort law should be concerned is the wrongful intent to harm, we
know that the actors have done something worse than mere carelessness. The vocabulary of recklessness gives us a way to express,
in a nuanced way, our sense that someone who knowingly causes
harm without desiring to cause harm has acted more wrongfully
than someone who unknowingly causes harm.
IV. INTENT AND RECKLESSNESS
It is a mystery to me why we would want the definition of intent to capture states of affairs that seem so much more clearly described by the concept of recklessness. If we step back from the Re-

notes, the latter definition of recklessness is designed to push it away from an objective standard
and towards a subjective standard. See Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 2. Unlike under Sec.
tion 500, Section 2 requires knowledge at some level: the actor must "have knowledge of the
danger or have knowledge of facts which would make the danger obvious to anyone in the actor's
situation." And see Cane, supra note 18, at 538 (criticizing effort to define recklessness without
reference to a conscious mental state).
28. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1152, 1155-56.
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statement for a moment, we should reflect on why we would want to
adopt a critical attitude towards someone (1) who believed that his
act would produce a certain proscribed and injurious consequence,
(2) who did not desire to bring that consequence about, and (3) who
nonetheless took steps that brought about that consequence. I contend that our reasons have less to do with the wrongfulness of that
person's ends (what they wanted) and more to do with the wrongfulness of how that person achieved their ends (how they got what
they wanted). This is exactly what makes us treat recklessness differently from mere negligence. 29 Taking the Nontrespassatory Double Effect actor as the "hardest" case (since it cannot be brought
under transferred intent), I would argue that we should be skeptical of the Restatement's hasty assumption that substantial certainty
is the conceptual equivalent of desire. To desire and choose an
other-regarding consequence in tort is to exercise one's will over
another. It is more than valuing one's ends over another (which is
bad enough); it is to act with the end of affecting another. Part of
the point (not necessarily the pleasure, for there may be none) of
achieving what one desires in intentional tort is to see the achievement of one's desires made material in the world and by affecting
another's rights in tort.30 On the other hand, the reckless actor,
while exercising his will in the world, is not wrongful because he
aims to impose his will on another. He is wrongful because he imposes his will on the world without regard for the consequences of
its imposition. Rather than the intentional wrongdoer, for whom
the consequences that flow from his act are part of the point of

29. It is interesting to note that Comment f of Section 500 in the Restatement (Second) (C'Intentional misconduct and recklessness contrasted") has been removed from Section 2. which has
no Comment analogous to Comment f or Comment g ( Negligence and recklessness contrasted').
I think this is significant in at least the case of comment & which made little or no sense: it described a major difference between recklessness and intent as lying in the fact that an actor who
realizes that there is a "strong probability" that his act may harm, "even though he hopes" that
his act will prove harmless is acting recklessly, not intentionally. The difference between this

characterization of recklessness and the belief prong of Section 8A is difficult to see, and the fact
that the Discussion Draft does not retain it is a step in the right direction.
30. As Finnis puts it, 'Vhen one intends some harm to (an)other human person or persons
...

one is shaping oneself as one who, in the most straightforward way, exploits others ....

in

each case the reality and the fulfillment of those other persons is radically subjected to one's ovn
reality and fulfillment." Finnis, supra note 16, at 244. This is very similar to Jean Hampton's
account of "moral injury" which she used to explain the role of retribution in tort law: that is,
retribution is warranted when an actor falsely elevates his moral worth above another by wrongfully exercising his will upon them. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting
Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1677 (1992); Anthony J. Sebok, Legal
Culture and the Desire for Retribution: Punishment in German and American Private Law (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (applying the concept of "moral injury" to punitive
damages in tort law).
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acting, the reckless actor is blameworthy because he knows that
there is a disproportionate risk of harm flowing from the consequences of his act but he does not care enough to address that risk.
In this regard, the Nontrespassatory Double Effect actor is just like
the reckless actor: the Nontrespassatory Double Effect actor's will
would not be thwarted or diminished-his sense of himself in the
world would remain unaltered-if, as a result of a miracle, the fire
that was "substantially certain" to kill V was extinguished, and V
lived. The moral root of our desire to treat the Nontrespassatory
Double Effect actor with the elevated concern in tort that accompanies the label "intentional tort" seems to grow, beneath the surface
of the Restatement, out of the same branch as the moral intuitions
that lead us to treat reckless acts with elevated concern.
V. How REALITY EMBARRASSES THEORY: THE SHIFTING
BORDERLINE BETWEEN INTENT AND RECKLESSNESS IN THE
CASELAW

My argument therefore, is straightforward: we do not need
the belief prong to construct a sufficient and practical definition of
intent in tort. The desire prong plus the doctrine of transferred intent can handle all but a few cases, which are otherwise clear under
intentional tort doctrine. For those few cases that cannot fit under
the desire prong, I have argued that they are probably better seen
as cases of recklessness as defined by the new Section 2. In making
this argument, I realize that there are important consequences to
classifying a tort as arising from intentional wrongdoing as opposed
to recklessness. I want to conclude this Comment by considering
these consequences. In so doing, it may turn out that, were recklessness to become the new home for the remaining Nontrespassatory Double Effect cases that have no natural home under the desire prong, we might have to rethink the differential doctrinal
treatment of intentional torts and recklessness. This might be, I
suggest, a very fruitful research project for the future.
There is no obvious pattern to when and under what circumstances intentional torts are treated differently from torts arising
from recklessness. Generally speaking, recklessness is seen as another term for "gross negligence" and has, for that reason, often
been unreflectively viewed as a branch of negligence. One ought to
be suspicious of any equation between recklessness and negligence
given the prominent role that subjective knowledge plays in the
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definition of recklessness. 3 ' For this reason, recklessness has sat on
the borderline between intent and negligence, playing a limited
role. One might see recklessness as a gatekeeper: sometimes it allows the practical and moral consequences of intentional tort to be
visited on certain actors who otherwise were innocent of harboring
a specific desire of harming anyone.
The one place where recklessness and intentional tort are
treated the same is in the award of punitive damages. This is a profound and important fact: to the extent that the tort system's foundations are laid bare in its structure of damages, the equation of
intent with recklessness suggests that our intuition in the area of
civil wrongs is that conscious indifference may sometimes be as bad
as malice. On the other side of the ledger, the tort system generally
treats intentional torts and recklessness differently in the areas of
bankruptcy, workman's compensation, insurance, and contribution.
In bankruptcy, except for drunk driving, recklessly caused tort liability is dischargeable; intentionally caused tort liability is not. In
workman's compensation, recklessly caused injury is compensated
by the statutory insurance scheme; intentionally caused injury is
not. In insurance, most policies do not cover "expected" or intended
injuries caused by the insured, but they will cover injuries caused
by the reckless conduct of the insured. In contribution, courts will
generally allow a defendant who has acted recklessly to sue for contribution from another joint tortfeasor, but not if the defendant injured the victim intentionally. There are similar differences in
other, less active areas of doctrine, such as municipal liability and
statutes of limitations, but the foregoing should be enough to give a
flavor of the enduring doctrinal importance of whether a court concludes that a defendant has acted intentionally or recklessly.
I am not sure whether the subset of cases that I argue ought
to be seen as properly covered by the category of recklessness
rather than intent (cases of Nontrespassatory Double Effect) ought
not to be treated differently than intentional torts when it comes to
the question of dischargeability, workman's compensation, and insurance. This would require a more general theory about when and
why, in each of these doctrinal categories, the legal system ought to
sanction differential treatment of parties based on the defendants'
culpability or state of mind. It is clear that, were my argument to

31. Subjective knowledge of circumstances that would lead someone in the same situation to
recognize the risk is necessary under Section 2. Neither actual recognition of the risk nor subjective understanding of the wrongfulness of imposing the risk is necessary, however. See supra
note 27.
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be accepted and some cases which are currently treated as intentional torts were treated differently once they were "reclassified" as
recklessness, does not in itself argue against my position. It might
just as much counsel a review of the doctrines that require the differential treatment.
Before we take that step, however, it should be pointed out
that it is possible that current doctrine already recognizes that the
current definitions of intent and recklessness do not conform to the
goals of the doctrines, whatever they may be. Thus, in workman's
compensation, we see that many courts refuse to adopt the Restatement's current definition of intent (thereby allowing fewer employees to sue their employers in tort than the Restatement's definition would otherwise suggest). Further, where courts have accepted
the Restatement definition, there is debate among judges as to
whether a knowing imposition of substantial risk upon a group of
workers should be classified as acting with substantial certainty so
that, in the interests of justice, the injured worker can avail himself
of a tort remedy outside of the workman's compensation insurance
scheme.3 2 Among each group of judges (the former, who think that
it should be harder for workers to sue in tort, and the latter, who
think it is should be easier), it is clear that behind their analysis is
a concern that the legal consequences of placing the employer's act
on one or another side of the reckless/intent divide should fit our
intuitions about the basic justice of allowing employees to opt out of
the workman's compensation insurance bargain.
Similarly, among those courts who have agreed that Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code's 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(6) to insure that tort liability resulting from reckless acts could be discharged, there is still a debate over the point at which the knowing
imposition of an unreasonable risk satisfies the belief prong of the
Restatement's definition of intent. Thus, in Geiger v. Kawaauhau,
the dissent pointed out that the majority, in holding that the debt
could be discharged because the knowing provision of substandard
medicine is not equivalent to acting with substantial certainty of
causing harm, had made the belief prong a nullity.3 3 The bank-

32. See the dissenting opinions in Suarez v. Dickrnont Plastics,Corp., 698 A.2d 838, 852-58
(Conn. 1997); Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics,Corp., 639 A-2d 507, 515-19 (Conn. 1994); and Fisher
v. Shenandoah General Construction Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 884-88 (Fla. 1986). In Wells v. IFR
Engineering,Co., 617 N.E.2d 204 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), the court upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs
complaint because the plaintiff had alleged that the employer knew that there was a "strong
possibility" of employee's death as a result of breathing toxic fumes, not a "substantial certainty."
33. Geiger v. Kawaauhau, 113 F.3d 848, 859 (8th Cir. 1997).

2001]

PURPOSE,BELIEF,AND RECKLESSNESS

1183

ruptcy court from which this appeal had been taken had not allowed the debt to be discharged on the theory that 11 U.S.C. § 523
(a)(6) applied to both intentional and reckless acts. 34 The Eighth
Circuit reversed on the theory that the bankrupt's right to discharge included liabilities resulting from reckless acts. The real
issue at the heart of the appeal, as the dissent pointed out, was
whether the court should have decided the issue of dischargeability
by looking at what the bankrupt did, as opposed to whether what he
did was technically recklessness or intent. According to the dissent,
what should have mattered most to the court was that the bankrupt
doctor's "admitted administration of substandard care show[ed] an
almost certain likelihood of harm;" hence, the doctor should not be
shielded by the bankruptcy code. 35 The pressure to decide whether
the doctor acted intentionally, and whether intent includes the belief prong, results from the idea that only harms caused by intentional wrongs cannot be discharged. In fact, however, bankruptcy
law is of two minds on this point. For example, where an actor
causes harm while drunk, his debts to his victim will not be dischargeable, even though injury resulting from drunkenness seems
to be a paradigm example of recklessness, not intent. 36
The same refusal to allow definitional formalism to drive
substantive results can be seen in cases concerning insurance coverage. Since most homeowners insurance excludes coverage of the
consequences of intended or expected tortious acts, one often sees
insurance companies endeavoring to convince courts to classify as
many of their insured's acts as possible as "intended or expected"
(while, conversely, the insured-and, sometimes, the insured's victim-consistently tries to convince the court of just the opposite).
The application of the Restatement definitions is clearly abandoned
in certain extremely compelling cases. So, for example, while in
cases involving chemical leaks, courts have held that "expected"
cannot mean "what [the insured] should have known" would occur
if, for 31 years, it willfully stockpiled chemical wastes on top of, and
next to, the local water table and aquifer.3 7 "Expected" can apply to
"[s]ome actions [which are] so likely to result in injury that, as a
matter of law, the court will find that the injury did not result from
an accident regardless of the actor's subjective intent or expecta34. Geiger v. Kawaauhau, 172 B.R. 916 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).
35. Geiger, 113 F.3d at 859.

36. See Ray v. Ray, 51 B.R. 236, 240 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985) C([O]ne who voluntarily embarks
upon a course, which a reasonable person knows, or should know, may significantly impair ability to exercise reasonable care, should be held to have intended the consequences which occur").
37.

Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal App. 4th 715, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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tions."38 This latter group of cases involves, for example, cases in

which the insured intentionally fires a gun at someone,3 9 or cases of
an adult's molestation of a minor. 40 It is clear, for a variety of rea-

sons, that an insurance company can refuse to pay for the harmful
consequences of its insured's pointing a gun at someone and pulling
the trigger or of molesting a minor. It is less clear that the reason
for this is because in every such episode, it must have been the case
that the insured was actually substantially certain that he was
making a contact (in the gun case) or a harmful contact (in the molestation case). In fact, if one were to ignore the outcomes at stake
(whether the shooter or molester are held personally liable for their
acts), one might naturally describe the shooter's, or molester's,
state of mind as one of conscious indifference or recklessness. One
who points a gun at another and pulls the trigger, but who sincerely
and subjectively does not desire to harm the other, is acting without
regard to the very large risk that he is imposing on his victim.
Similarly, one who forces a sexual encounter upon a minor, but who
sincerely and subjectively does not desire to harm the other, is acting without regard to the very large risk he is imposing on his victim. Even if these actors truly desire that no harm result from their
acts, they are nonetheless reckless. As such, they are subject to the
moral opprobrium that attaches to that legal conclusion. They are
subject to punitive damages, just as if they had satisfied the Restatement definition of intent. Whether they should, in addition, be
able to turn to their insurance companies for coverage is something
which should be decided according to our views about whether, as a
matter of substantive policy, these sorts of reckless actors should
expect coverage. Deciding the question by reclassifying their reckless acts as intentional is an ad hoc and unprincipled solution that

38. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F. Supp. 1270, 1280 (D. Utah 1995) (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Blanco, 804 P.2d 876, 878 (Haw. 1990); State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In neither of these cases did
the court rely upon the not unreasonable observation that the insured may have intended a
contact but not a harmful contact. Instead the courts simply concluded that, as a matter of law,
"the intentional firing of a gun in the direction of an individual qualifies as an act which carries
with it the reasonableforeseeability of harm, from which we may infer the intent to injure."
40. See, e.g., Patterson, 904 F. Supp. at 1281 (citing Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 995 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCranie, 716 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D. Fla.
1989)). Again, in these cases, the intent to make an unpermitted touching is not enough to provide an inference of harmful intent; in cases of sexual molestation between two adults or a minor
molesting an adult, harmful intent will not be inferred from an intent to make an unpormitted
sexual contact. See id. at 1282 n.11 (citing R.W. v. T.F., 510 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. Ct. App, 1994)
(two adults)); see also Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1994) (molester was a child and victim was an adult)).
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only underscores the deep incoherence of the Restatement definitions.
V. CONCLUSION

Henderson and Twerski have done the Reporters of Restatement (Third) a tremendous service by reminding them and the
larger academic community of the role of definitions in the crafting
of a Restatement (or, for that matter, any serious common law project). It is in the spirit of this larger project that I have suggested
that their specific comments on the Restatement's Section 1 do not
go far enough or serve their ultimate goals. The definition of intent
has grown in a haphazard manner throughout the history of the
Restatement project. While sensitivity to history is one part of the
practical craft of Restatement writing, so is sensitivity to coherence
and a willingness to step back and reevaluate familiar structures.
In the past 70 years, the desire prong of the Restatement's definition of intent has grown in importance without a clear mandate. In
the meantime, recklessness has also become an increasingly important means of expressing society's outrage at a certain form of antisocial conduct. My proposal is that, in the interest of approaching
the Restatement from a holistic and practical perspective, we should
ask whether the belief prong is necessary.
I have argued that the belief prong is unattractive from a
conceptual point of view, and that from a practical point of view,
most of the cases it covers can be handled either by the desire prong
of Restatement Section 1 (through transferred intent) or Restatement Section 2, which defines recklessness. I recognize that, except
for punitive damages, there remains a complex pattern of doctrinal
differences between intentional torts and torts resulting from recklessness or conscious indifference. I am not sure yet whether my
suggestion-to eliminate the belief prong--counsels a further "harmonization" of doctrinal treatment in statutes of limitations, insurance, bankruptcy, workman's compensation, etcetera, or between
Sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement. The persistence of the differential treatment of intent and recklessness is itself prima facie evidence that the tort system (that is to say, the judges who apply its
rules) recognizes important differences between the states of mind
captured by these culpable yet varied categories that exist beyond
the borders of negligence. I would take this messy state of affairs as
an invitation to look more closely at the acts that we treat differentially under these doctrines and argue that the differences could be
made more coherent and explicable if they tracked a distinction
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that placed intent (meaning desire) on one side and recklessness
(meaning conscious indifference), as well as acting with "substantial certainty," on the other.

